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Apple: Privacy vs. Safety (B)

From my American mind-set, I believe strongly in freedoms. . . . I also know each country in the world decides their laws and regulations.

– Tim Cook, Apple CEO¹

This kind of partnership between an American company and a dictatorial regime is at odds with the image Apple has built as a company committed to privacy and a willingness to stand up to pressure from larger entities like the United States government.

– Chen Guangcheng, Chinese Civil Rights Activist²

In February 2016, Apple refused the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)'s request to help access the encrypted iPhone of the husband of a married couple who professed allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and killed 14 people in the San Bernardino terrorist attack. Investigators ultimately withdrew the request and gained access via third-party software.³ However, this was a temporary fix. The next year, Apple encryption blocked investigators from accessing the iPhone belonging to a gunman who killed himself and 26 people as they worshipped at the First Baptist Church of Sutherland Springs, Texas.⁴ In late 2017, the FBI claimed encryption had prevented them from accessing 6,900 devices, representing more than half of the devices that investigators had tried to access in the preceding 11 months.^{a,5}

During that time, Apple had remained the most profitable player in the smartphone market⁶ and the largest company in the world by market capitalization.⁷ Apple sold phones with end-to-end encryption and explained that creating a technique to unlock encrypted phones would risk the privacy of customers, as “the technique could be used over and over again, on any number of devices.”⁸

Apple also faced government pressures in China. Virtual Private Network (VPN) applications (apps) allowed Chinese smartphone users to bypass government censors online and browse any website available in other countries. Chinese regulations required that VPNs operate only with an official government license, which was expensive and difficult to obtain. This effectively restricted

^a In May 2018, the FBI announced that it had miscounted the number of inaccessible devices. An FBI statement blamed the miscout on “programming errors.” An internal report estimated the correct number to be 1,000 to 2,000 devices. Devlin Barrett, “FBI repeatedly overstated encryption threat figures to Congress, public,” *The Washington Post*, May 22, 2018, <https://wapo.st/2sd9iNq>, accessed May 2018.

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access to a few high-paying corporate users. In January 2017, Chinese authorities announced a crackdown on unlicensed VPNs.⁹ In July, Apple notified developers that VPN apps would be removed from its App Store in China.¹⁰ Apple CEO Tim Cook explained, “We would obviously rather not remove the apps, but [. . .] we follow the law wherever we do business. We strongly believe participating in markets and bringing benefits to customers is in the best interest of the folks there and in other countries as well.”¹¹ Chinese Android app stores also removed VPN apps.¹²

Cook’s decision in China, one of Apple’s most important markets, drew sharp criticism both in the U.S. and abroad. U.S. senators noted that Cook’s decision could be construed as a betrayal of the 2017 Free Expression Award Cook had accepted earlier in the year.¹³ One *New York Times* columnist wrote that Cook “made clear that Apple would obey American law – but only after trying to shape the law.”¹⁴ The columnist continued, “Search Apple’s website for a letter from Mr. Cook issuing a public rebuke of China’s intrusion into his customers’ privacy and freedom of expression—you won’t find it. The company has not fully tested its political and economic leverage in China.”¹⁵ A Chinese investor in one of the affected VPN services spoke bluntly in an anonymous interview: “Apple is kissing ass, so that they can protect their revenue stream in China.”¹⁶ One Chinese writer living abroad wrote, “Apple CEO Tim Cook was woefully ignorant about the true meanings of ‘openness’ and ‘shared benefits,’” and that as a result of censorship, “public discussion is stunted, grievances are suppressed, and wrongdoers are not held accountable.”¹⁷ Others compared Apple to its rival Google, which withdrew from China in 2010 rather than comply with policies to censor certain search results.¹⁸

In China, during December 2017, Cook took the opportunity to defend Apple’s position: “When you go into a country and participate in a market, you are subject to the laws and regulations of that country. [. . .] Your choice is, do you participate or do you stand on the sideline and yell at how things should be. My own view very strongly is you show up and you participate, you get in the arena, because nothing ever changes from the sideline.”¹⁹

By early 2018, Chinese government regulations^b requiring domestic storage of domestic data prompted Apple to offer its customers in China using iCloud, its backup storage, a choice.²⁰ They could stop using iCloud, or they could continue using the service by agreeing to let Apple migrate their data to the care of a state-owned enterprise, Guizhou-Cloud Big Data (GCBD). In migrating to GCBD, customers had to accept new terms of service that asked users to “agree that Apple and GCBD will have access to all data [stored] on this service, including the right to share, exchange and disclose all user data, including content, to and between each other under applicable law.”²¹

While Chinese customers’ iCloud data would remain encrypted, Apple agreed to store the encryption keys in China. As a result, Chinese authorities could make requests for user data without going through U.S. courts. China did not have its own system for independent judicial review of warrants, and there were only light penalties to police for overreach. Human rights groups worried that authorities would use their powers to spy on texts, emails, and other data from dissident users.²²

Apple said that it would indeed comply with any legal request from the Chinese government for iCloud search, as it complied with legal requests for such data in the U.S. However, Apple said that it would refuse any “bulk” data-gathering requests and had not built a “backdoor” to data for the Chinese authorities.²³ Furthermore, Apple reminded customers that iPhone end-to-end encryption remained in place, and users could store all data on their phones without using iCloud storage at all.²⁴

^b In 2016, China had passed a cybersecurity law that required cloud companies to store Chinese citizens’ data domestically and allow authorities to spot-check network operations. Jack Wagner, “China’s Cybersecurity Law: What You Need to Know,” *The Diplomat*, June, 1, 2017, <https://bit.ly/2knS6Bg>, accessed March 2018.

Endnotes

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